Regularity of dividend payments in the Brazilian electricity sector: solution to the agency conflict?
Resumo
In Brazil, companies in the electricity sector are leveled at the same level of corporate governance thanks to the regulation of the sector (SOUZA et al., 2015). In addition, they pay high dividends to their shareholders compared to other unregulated companies (SILVA, 2019a). The main hypothesis of this paper is that (a) companies in the electricity sector that pay irregular dividends lead to lower stock prices, as they convey uncertainty to the market by not effectively resolving the agency conflict, mainly present in utilities and (b) electricity companies that concentrate dividend payments pay higher yields than those that pay several dates a year. Conclusions: There was no empirical support to justify hypothesis (a). The yield of companies that pay dividends at various dates in the year is higher than the yield of companies that pay dividends only once a year. Companies that maintain multiple dividend payouts per year have a higher yield than companies with inconsistent dividend payouts, showing the importance of the regularity of dividend payouts relative to yield.
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